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Résumé: Le jugement majoritaire est une méthode d'élection. Cette méthode est 
l'aboutissement d'une nouvelle théorie du choix social où les électeurs jugent les 
candidats au lieu de les ranger. La théorie est développée dans d'autres 
publications ([2, 4]). Cet article décrit et analyse des expériences électorales 
conduites pendant les deux dernières élections présidentielles françaises dans 
plusieurs buts: (1) démontrer que le jugement majoritaire est une méthode 
pratique, (2) la décrire et établir ses principales propriétés, (3) démontrer qu'elle 
échappe aux paradoxes classiques, et (4) illustrer comment dans la pratique tous 
les mécanismes de vote connus violent certains critères importants. Les 
démonstrations utilisent des concepts et méthodes nouveaux.   
 
Abstract: The majority judgement is a method of election. It is the consequence of a new 
theory of social choice where voters judge candidates instead of ranking them. 
The theory is explained elsewhere [2, 4]. This article describes and analyzes 
electoral experiments conducted in parallel with the last two French presidential 
elections to: (1) show that the majority judgement is a practical method, (2) 
describe it and its salient properties, (3) establish that it escapes the classical 
paradoxes, (4) illustrate how in practice the well known electoral mechanisms all 
fail to meet important criteria. The demonstrations introduce new concepts and 
methods. 
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Abstract
The majority judgement is a method of election. It is the consequence of a
new theory of social choice where voters judge candidates instead of ranking
them. The theory is developed elsewhere [2, 4]. This article describes and
analyzes electoral experiments conducted in parallel with the last two French
presidential elections to: (1) show that the majority judgement is a practical
method, (2) describe it and establish its salient properties, (3) establish that it
escapes the classical paradoxes, and (4) illustrate how in practice the well known
electoral mechanisms all fail to meet important criteria. These demonstrations
introduce new concepts and methods.
Introduction
Throughout the world the choice of one from among a set of candidates is
accomplished by elections. Elections are mechanisms for amalgamating the
wishes of individuals into a decision of society. Many different mechanisms have
been proposed and/or used.
Most rely on the idea that voters compare candidates—one is better than
another—so have lists of “preferences” in their minds. These include first-
past-the-post (in at least two avatars), Condorcet’s [9], Borda’s [7] (and similar
methods that assign scores to places in the lists of preferences and then add
them), convolutions of Condorcet’s and/or Borda’s, the single transferable vote
(also in at least two versions), and approval voting (in one interpretation).
Electoral mechanisms are also used in a host of other circumstances where
winners and orders-of-finish must be determined by a jury of judges, including
figure skaters, divers, gymnasts, pianists, and wines. Invariably, as the great
mathematician Laplace was the first to propose two centuries ago [18], they ask
voters (or judges) not to compare but to evaluate the competitors by assigning
points from some range, points expressing an absolute measure of the competi-
tors’ merits. Laplace suggested the range [0, R] for some arbitrary positive real
number R, whereas practical systems usually fix R at some positive integer.
These mechanisms rank the candidates according to the sums or the averages of
their points1 (sometimes after dropping highest and lowest scores). They have
been emulated in various schemes proposed for voting with ranges taken to be
integers in [0, 100], or in [0, 5], or the integers 0, 1, and 2, or the integers 0 and
1 (approval voting).
It is fair to ask whether any of these mechanisms—based on comparisons or
sums of measures of merit—actually makes the choice that corresponds to the
true wishes of society, in theory or in practice. All have their supporters, yet
all have serious drawbacks: every one of them fails to meet some property that
a good mechanism should satisfy. In consequence, the basic challenge remains:
to find a mechanism of election, prove it satisfies the properties, and show it is
practical.
The existing voting mechanisms have for the most part been viewed and
analyzed in terms of the traditional model of social choice theory: individual
voters have in their minds “preference” lists of the candidates, and the decision
to be made is to find society’s winning candidate or to find society’s “prefer-
ence” list from best (implicitly the winner) to worst. All of the mechanisms
based on this model are wanting because of paradoxes that occur in practice—
Condorcet’s, Arrow’s and others—and impossibilities—Kenneth Arrow’s [1] and
Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s [13, 23]. Moreover, as Peyton Young has shown [24, 25],
in this model finding the rank-ordering wished by a society is a very different
problem than finding the winner wished by a society: said more strikingly, the
winner wished by society is not necessarily the first placed candidate of the
1Laplace only used this model to deduce Borda’s method via probabilistic arguments. He
then rejected Borda’s method because of its evident manipulability.
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ranking wished by society! In fact, the traditional model harbors a fundamen-
tal incompatibility between winning and ranking [2, 4]. The mechanisms based
on assigning points and summing or averaging them seem to escape the Arrow
paradox (though that, it will be seen, is an illusion), but they are all wide
open to strategic manipulation. However, evaluating merits, as Laplace had
imagined, opens the door to a new theory free of these defects.
“During the Middle Ages,” Richard Feynman once wrote, “there were all
kinds of crazy ideas, such as that a piece of rhinoceros horn would increase
potency. Then a method was discovered for separating the ideas—which was to
try one to see if it worked, and if it didn’t work, to eliminate it. This method
became organized, of course, into science.” The idea that voting depends on
comparisons between pairs of candidates—the basic paradigm of the theory of
social choice—dates to medieval times: Ramon Llull proposed a refinement of
Condorcet’s criterion in 1299 and Nicolaus Cusanus proposed Borda’s method
in 1433 (see, [20, 14, 15]). The impossibility and incompatibility theorems are
one good reason to discard the traditional model. The 2007 experiment with the
majority judgement described in this article provides another: fully one third
of the voters declined to designate one “favorite” candidate, and on average
voters rejected over one third of the candidates. These evaluations cannot be
expressed with “preference” lists. Thus, on the one hand the traditional model
harbors internal inconsistencies, and on the other hand voters do not in fact
have in their minds the inputs the traditional model imagines, rank orders of
the candidates. The model doesn’t work, so must be eliminated.
The majority judgement is a new mechanism based on a different model of
the problem of voting (inspired by practices in ranking wines, figure skaters,
divers, and others). It encompasses the traditional approach and the scoring
systems. It asks voters to evaluate every candidate in a common language of
grades—thus to judge each one on an absolute scale—rather than to compare
them. Assigning a value or grade permits comparisons of candidates, compar-
isons of candidates does not permit evaluations (or any expression of intensity).
In this paradigm the majority judgement emerges as the unique acceptable
mechanism for amalgamating individuals’ wishes into society’s wishes. Given
the grades assigned by voters to the candidates, it determines the final-grades of
each candidate and orders them according to their final-grades. The final-grades
are not sums or averages. The majority judgement avoids the paradoxes and
impossibilities of the traditional model.
The theory that shows why the majority judgement is a satisfactory answer
to the basic challenge is described and developed elsewhere (see [2, 4]). The
aim of this article is to describe electoral experiments that show it provides
a practical answer to the basic challenge and that it satisfies the important
properties of social choice—or comes as close to satisfying them as possible.
The demonstration invokes new methods of validation and new concepts. The
experiments, and the elections in which they were conducted, are also used to
show how the well known mechanisms fail to satisfy important properties.
2
1 Background of the experiments
The experiments were conducted in the context of the French presidential elec-
tions of 2002 and 2007. To begin, their salient features are described.
The French constitution (Article 7) states:
The president of the Republic is elected by an absolute majority of
the votes. If it is not obtained in the first round of the election, a
second round is held two Sundays later. The only two candidates
who may present themselves, after the eventual withdrawal of more
favored candidates, are those who have the largest number of votes
in the first round.
The precise mechanism used in each of the rounds2 is implicitly the “first-
past-the-post” system: it gives to each voter the possibility of casting one vote
for at most one candidate and the “order of finish” is determined by the total
obtained by each candidate. Except for the provision of a “run-off” between the
top two finishers, this is exactly the mechanism used in the U.S. presidential
elections and primaries in each state: an elector has no way of expressing her or
his opinions concerning candidates except to designate exactly one “favorite.”
In consequence—imagine for the moment a field of at least three candidates—his
or her vote counts for nothing in designating the winner unless it was cast for the
“winner,” for no expression concerning the remaining two or more candidates
is possible.
Moreover, the first-past-the-post system is subject to Arrow’s paradox—
the winner may change because of the presence or absence of “irrelevant”
candidates—as is practically every system that is used to elect a candidate
throughout the world. The U.S. presidential election of 2000 is a good example
(see table 1). Ralph Nader had no chance whatever to be elected, but his can-
didacy for Florida’s 26 electoral votes alone was enough to change the outcome
of the election.3
2000 Election National vote Electoral College Florida vote
George W. Bush 50,456,002 271 2,912,790
Albert Gore 50,999,897 266 2,912,253
Ralph Nader 2,882,955 0 97,488
Table 1. Votes: United States presidential election of 2000.
French presidential election of 2002
The French presidential election of 2002 with its sixteen candidates is a veritable
story-book example of the inanity of the first-past-the-post mechanism (see
2There have always been two rounds. The first direct popular election of the President in
the fifth Republic (instituted in 1958) was in 1965: in the first round Charles de Gaulle had
44.64% of the vote, Franc¸ois Mitterrand 31.72%. Together they received 76.36%. In every
subsequent election the top two together received a lower percentage. In 2002 the top seven
together received 76.04%.
3This, of course, assumes that the vast majority of Nader’s votes would have gone to Gore.
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table 2). Jacques Chirac, the incumbent President, was the candidate of the
Rassemblement pour la Re´publique (RPR), the big party of the “legitimate”
right; Lionel Jospin, the incumbent Prime-Minister, that of the Parti Socialist
(PS); Jean-Marie Le Pen that of the extreme right, Front National party (FN);
and Franc¸ois Bayrou that of the moderate Union pour la De´mocratie Franc¸aise
(UDF, the ex-President Vale´ry Giscard d’Estaing’s party). Arlette Laguiller was
the perennial candidate of a party of the extreme left, the Lutte Ouvrie`re. The
extreme right had two candidates, Le Pen and Bruno Me´gret; the moderate right
five, Chirac, Bayrou, Alain Madelin, Christine Boutin, and Corinne Lepage; the
left and greens four, Jospin, Jean-Pierre Che´ve`nement, Christiane Taubira, and
Noe¨l Mame`re; and the extreme left four, Laguiller, Olivier Besancenot, Robert
Hue, and Daniel Gluckstein. One group managed to present only one candidate,
Jean Saint-Josse: the hunters.
J. Chirac J.-M. Le Pen L. Jospin F. Bayrou
19.88% 16.86% 16.18% 6.84%
A. Laguiller J.-P. Che´ve`nement N. Mame`re O. Besancenot
5.72% 5.33% 5.25% 4.25%
J. Saint-Josse A. Madelin R. Hue B. Me´gret
4.23% 3.91% 3.37% 2.34%
C. Taubira C. Lepage C. Boutin D. Gluckstein
2.32% 1.88% 1.19% 0.47%
Table 2. Votes: French presidential election, first-round, April 21, 2002.
France fully expected a run-off between Chirac and Jospin, and was pro-
foundly shocked to be faced with a choice between Chirac and Le Pen. Chirac
crushed Le Pen, obtaining 82.2% of the votes in the second round, but the vast
majority of Chirac’s votes were against Le Pen rather than for him. The left—
socialists, communists, trotskyists, . . . ,—had no choice but to vote for Chirac!
His votes represented very different sentiments and intensities.
Most polls predicted that Jospin would have won against Chirac with a nar-
row majority; Sofres predicted a 50%-50% tie on the eve of the first round.4 Had
either Che´vene`ment, an ex-socialist, or Taubira, a socialist, withdrawn, most of
his 5.3% or her 2.3% of the votes would have gone to Jospin, so the second round
would have seen a Chirac-Jospin confrontation, as had been expected. In fact,
Taubira had offered to withdraw if the PS was prepared to cover her expenses,
but that offer was refused. It has also been whispered that the RPR helped to
finance Taubira’s campaign (a credible strategic gambit backed by no specific
evidence). Moreover, if Charles Pasqua, an aging past ally of Chirac, had been
a candidate—as he had announced he would be—then he could well have drawn
a sufficient number of votes from Chirac to produce a second round between
Jospin and Le Pen, which would have resulted in a lopsided win for Jospin.
4In their last 11 predictions (late February to the election), the Sofres polls showed Jospin
winning 7 times, Chirac 2 times, a tie 2 times.
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Anything can happen when the “first-past-the-post” (or the “first-two-past-
the-post”) mechanism is used! This—and the Nader Florida phenomenon—is
nothing but Arrow’s paradox: the winner depends on the presence or absence of
candidates including those who have absolutely no chance of winning. It is also
a clear proof that these mechanisms invite “strategic” candidacies: candidates
who cannot hope to win (or survive a first round) but can cause another to
win (or to reach the second round) by drawing votes away from an opposing
candidate .
French presidential election of 2007
French voting behavior in the presidential election of 2007 was very much in-
fluenced by the experience of 2002. There were twelve candidates. Nicolas
Sarkozy was the candidate of the UMP (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire,
founded in 2002 by Chirac), its president and the incumbent minister of the
interior; Se´gole`ne Royal that of the PS; Bayrou again that of the UDF (though
he announced immediately after the first round that he would create a new
party, the MoDem or Mouvement de´mocrate); and Le Pen again that of the
FN. The extreme left had five candidates—Besancenot (again), Marie-George
Buffet, Laguiller (again), Jose´ Bove´, and Ge´rard Schivardi—, the extreme right
had two—Le Pen (of course) and Philippe de Villiers—and the hunters one,
Fre´de´ric Nihous.
N. Sarkozy S. Royal F. Bayrou J.-M. Le Pen
31.18% 25.87% 18.57% 10.44%
O. Besancenot P. de Villiers M.-G. Buffet D. Voynet
4.08% 2.23% 1.93% 1.57%
A. Laguiller J. Bove´ F. Nihous G. Schivardi
1.33% 1.32% 1.15% 0.34%
Table 3. Votes: French presidential election, first round, April 22, 2007.
The distribution of the votes among the twelve candidates in the first round
is given in table 3. In the second round Nicolas Sarkozy defeated Se´gole`ne Royal
by 18,983,138 votes (or 53.06%) to 16,790,440 (or 46.94%).
In response to the debacle of 2002, the number of registered voters increased
sharply (from 41.2 million in 2002 to 44.5 million in 2007), and voter partici-
pation was mammouth: 84% of registered voters participated in both rounds.
Voting is, of course, a strategic act. In 2007 voters were acutely aware of the im-
portance of who would survive the first round. Many who believed that voting
for their preferred candidate could again lead to a catastrophic second round,
voted differently. Some, in the belief that their preferred candidate was sure to
reach the second round, may have voted for that candidate’s easiest-to-defeat
opponent. Such behavior—a deliberate strategic vote for a candidate who is not
the elector’s favorite (“le vote utile”)—was much debated by the candidates and
the media, and was practiced. A poll conducted on election day5 asked electors
5by Tns - Sofres - Unilog Groupe Logica CMG, April 22, 2007.
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what most determined their votes. One of the seven possible answers was a
deliberate strategic vote: this answer was given by 22% of those (who said they
voted) for Bayrou, 10% of those for Le Pen, 31% of those for Royal and 25% of
those for Sarkozy. Comparing the first rounds in 2002 and 2007 also suggests
deliberate strategic votes were important in 2007: in 2002 the seven minor candi-
dates of the left and the greens (Laguiller, Che´ve`nement, Mame`re, Besancenot,
Hue, Taubira, Gluckstein) had 26.71% of the vote whereas in 2007 six obtained
only 10.57% (Besancenot, Buffet, Voynet, Laguiller, Bove´, Schivardi); in 2002
the five minor candidates of the right and the hunters (Saint-Josse, Madelin,
Me´gret, Lepage, Boutin) had 13.55% of the vote whereas in 2007 two obtained
only 3.38% (Villiers, Nihous).
The very fact of being a candidate is a strategic act. To become an offi-
cial candidate requires five hundred signatures. They are drawn from a pool
of about forty-seven thousand elected officials who represent the one hundred
departments, must include signatures coming from at least thirty departments,
but no more than 10% from any one department. Both Besancenot and Le Pen
appeared to have difficulty in obtaining them. Sarkozy publicly announced he
would help them obtain the necessary signatures, as a service to democracy.
In the period leading up to the first round of voting, the major candidates of
the right and the left—Sarkozy of the UMP and Royal of the PS—both argued
strenuously against Bayrou, the centrist. Both most feared him in a one-to-
one confrontation. The polls show why: as of February 2007 they consistently
suggested that Bayrou would defeat either one of them in the second round.
Immediately after the first round, Royal and Sarkozy both sought Bayrou’s
support6 and tried to incorporate some of his ideas along with theirs. Once
elected, Sarkozy, in naming many political personalities of the left to responsible
political positions (ministries, commissions, a coveted international position,
. . . ), put into effect one of Bayrou’s principal promises, the appointment of
persons from the left and the right (“l’ouverture”).
Polling results (table 4) suggest that Franc¸ois Bayrou was the Condorcet-
winner : he would have defeated any candidate in a head-to-head confrontation.
Moreover, the pair by pair confrontations (of March 28 and April 19) determine
an unambiguous order of finish (there is no “Condorcet cycle”): Bayrou is first,
Sarkozy second, Royal third and Le Pen last. The information in table 4 (of
March 28 and April 19) suffices to determine the “Borda scores”7 among the
four candidates. On March 28 the Borda-scores were: Bayrou 195, Sarkozy 184,
Royal 164, and Le Pen 57. On April 19 they were: Bayrou 193, Sarkozy 180,
Royal 164, and Le Pen 63. Condorcet and Borda agree on the order of finish.
Another experiment [11] was conducted in Faches-Thumesnil (a small town
in France’s northern-most department, Nord) on election day, where the official
6Royal subsequently revealed that she had offered Bayrou the position of prime-minister
at that time.
7A candidate’s Borda-score is the sum of the votes he or she receives in all pair by pair
votes. Equivalently, with n candidates, a voter gives n− 1 Borda-points to the first candidate
on his/her list, n − 2 to the second, down to 0 to the last. The sum of a candidate’s Borda-
points is the candidate’s Borda-score.
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results of the first round were close to the national percentages. Voters were
asked to rank-order the candidates, permitting the face-by-face confrontations
to be computed (see table 5): they yield the same unambiguous order of finish
among the four significant candidates. It may be observed that once again the
order of finish agrees with the Borda-ranking.
Dec. 15 Jan. 20 Feb. 15 Mar. 15 Mar. 28 Apr. 16 Apr. 19
Bayrou 45% 49% 52% 54% 54% 55%
Sarkozy 55% 51% 48% 46% 46% 45%
Bayrou 43% 50% 54% 60% 57% 58%
Royal 57% 50% 46% 40% 43% 42%
Bayrou 84% 80%
Le Pen 16% 20%
Sarkozy 49% 51% 53% 54% 54% 53% 51%
Royal 51% 49% 47% 46% 46% 47% 49%
Sarkozy 84% 84%
Le Pen 16% 16%
Royal 75% 73%
Le Pen 25% 27%
Table 4. Polls from December 2006 to April 2007 on potential second round
results (by IFOP, except on March 15 by Tns/Sofres).8
Bayrou Sarkozy Royal Le Pen
Bayrou – 52% 60% 80%
Sarkozy 48% – 54% 83%
Royal 40% 46% – 73%
Le Pen 20% 17% 27% –
Table 5. Projected second round results, from vote in Faches-Thumesnil
experiment [11]. (E.g., Sarkozy has 48% of the votes against Bayrou.)
2 The Majority Judgement
2007 experiment
The experiment took place in three of Orsay’s twelve voting precincts (the 1st,
6th and 12th). Orsay is a suburban town some 22 kilometers from the center of
Paris. In 2002 it was the site of the first large electoral experiment conducted in
parallel with a presidential election ([5], discussed below). The three precincts
were chosen among the five of the 2002 experiment as the most representative
of the town and its various socio-economic groups. Potential participants were
informed about the experiment well before the day of the first round by letter,
an article in the town’s quarterly magazine, an evening presentation open to all,
8A blank indicates no figure is available. Many more Sarkozy vs. Royal polls were con-
ducted.
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and posters (as had been done in 2002). The various communications explained
how the votes would be tallied and the candidates listed in order of finish, and
showed the ballot they would be asked to use.
It is important to realize that the three precincts of Orsay were not repre-
sentative of all of France: the order between Royal and Sarkozy was reversed,
Bayrou did much better than nationally and Le Pen much worse (see table 6).
N. Sarkozy S. Royal F. Bayrou J.-M. Le Pen
National 31.18% 25.87% 18.57% 10.44%
Orsay precincts 28.98% 29.92% 25.51% 5.89%
O. Besancenot P. de Villiers M.-G. Buffet D. Voynet
National 4.08% 2.23% 1.93% 1.57%
Orsay precincts 2.54% 1.91% 1.40% 1.69%
A. Laguiller J. Bove´ F. Nihous G. Schivardi
National 1.33% 1.32% 1.15% 0.34%
Orsay precincts 0.76% 0.93% 0.30% 0.17%
Table 6. French presidential election, first round, April 22, 2007:
national vote vs. vote in the three precincts of Orsay.
Ballot: Election of the President of France 2007
To be president of France,
having taken into account all considerations,
I judge, in conscience, that this candidate would be:9













Check one single grade in the line of each candidate.
No grade checked in the line of a candidate means to Reject the candidate.
Table 7. The majority judgement ballot (English translation).
9The question in French: “Pour pre´sider la France, ayant pris tous les e´le´ments en compte,
je juge en conscience que ce candidat serait:” The grades in French: “Tre`s bien, Bien, Assez
bien, Passable, Insuffisant, a` Rejeter.” The names of the candidates are given in the official
order, the result of a random draw.
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On April 22, the day of the first round, after voting officially in these three
precincts, voters were invited to participate in the experiment using the majority
judgement. A team of three to four knowledgeable persons were in constant
attendance to encourage participation and to answer questions. Voting a` la
majority judgement was carried out exactly as is usual in France: ballots were
filled in the privacy of voting booths, inserted into envelopes, and then deposited
in large transparent urns. A facsimile of the ballot (in translation) is given in
table 7.
Several comments concerning the ballot are in order. First, the voter is
confronted with a specific question which he or she is asked to answer. Second,
the answers, or evaluations, are given in a language of grades that is common
to all French citizens: with the exception of to Reject, they are the grades given
to school children. These evaluations are not numbers: they are not abstract
values or weights that a voter almost surely assumes will be added together to
assign a total score to each candidate (and so may encourage him or her to
exaggerate up or down), but mean the same thing (or close to the same thing)
to everyone.
Contrary to the predictions of several elected officials and many Parisian
“intellectuals,” the voters had no problem in filling out the ballots. For the
most part, one minute sufficed. The queues to vote by the majority judgement
were no longer than those to vote officially (though of course the experimental
vote did not require electors to sign registers or present their papers of identity).
Moreover, 1,752 of the 2,360 who voted officially (or 74%) participated in the
experiment: the waiting times could not have been long! In fact, the rate of
participation was slightly higher because in France a voter can assign to another
person a proxy to vote for him or her, and the experiment did not allow anyone to
vote more than once. 19 of the 1,752 ballots were indecipherable or deliberately
subverted, leaving a total of 1,733 valid ballots. Most of the voters who did not
participate in the experiment said they could not take the time, some seemed
to be hostile, several did not understand.
Each member of the team that conducted the experiment had the impression
that the participants were very glad to have the means to express their opin-
ions concerning all the candidates, and liked the idea that candidates would
be assigned grades.10 An effective argument to persuade reluctant voters to
participate was that the majority judgement allows a much fuller expression of
a voter’s opinions. The actual system offered voters only 13 possible messages :
to vote for one of the twelve candidates, or to vote for none. The majority
judgement offered voters more than 2 billion possible messages.11 Several par-
ticipants actually stated that the experiment had induced them to vote for the
first time: finally a method that permitted them to express themselves!
10A collection of television interviews of participants prepared by Raphae¨l Hitier, a journalist
of I-Te´le´, attests to these facts.
11With twelve candidates and six grades, there are 612 = 2, 176, 782, 336 possible messages.
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The results
Excllnt Very Gd Good Accptbl Poor to Rejct Sum
Avg./ballot 0.69 1.25 1.50 1.74 2.27 4.55 12
Table 8. Average number of grades per majority judgement ballot
(of the 4.55 to Reject, 0.5 corresponded to no grade).
Voters were particularly happy with the grade to Reject, and used it the
most: there was an average of 4.1 of to Reject per ballot and an average of 0.5
of no grade (which, in conformity with the stated rules, was counted as a to
Reject). Voters were parsimonious with high grades and generous with low ones
(see table 8). Only 52% of voters used a grade of Excellent ; 37% used Very
Good but no Excellent ; 9% used Good but no Excellent and no Very Good ; 2%
gave none of the three highest grades.
Six possible grades assigned to twelve candidates implies that a voter was
unable to express a preference between every pair of candidates. The number
of different grades actually used by voters shows that in any case they did not
wish to distinguish between every pair (see table 9) since only 14% used all six
grades. This suggests that six grades was quite sufficient. A scant 3% of the
voters used at most two grades, 13% at most three, suggesting that more than
three grades is necessary.
1 grade 2 grades 3 grades 4 grades 5 grades 6 grades
1% 2% 10% 31% 42% 14%
Table 9. Percentages of voters using k grades (k = 1, . . . , 6).
The highest grades were often multiple. 11% of the ballots had at least
two grades of Excellent ; 16% had at least two grades of Very Good and no
grade of Excellent ; almost 6% had at least two grades of Good, no Excellent, no
Very Good. In all, more than 33% of the ballots gave the highest grade to at
least two candidates. Thus one of every three voters did not designate a single
“best” candidate! This seems to indicate that voters conscientiously answered
the question that was posed. It also shows that many voters either saw nothing
(or very little) to prefer among several candidates or, at the least, were very
hesitant in making a choice among two, three or more candidates. Moreover,
many voters did not distinguish between the leading candidates: 17.9% gave the
same grade to Bayrou and Sarkozy (10.6% their highest grade to both), 23.3%
the same grade to Bayrou and Royal (11.7% their highest grade to both), and
14.3% the same grade to Sarkozy and Royal (4.1% their highest to both). Indeed,
4.8% gave the same grade to all three (4.1% their highest to all three: all who
gave their highest grade to Sarkozy and Royal also gave it to Bayrou!). These
are significant percentages: many elections are decided by smaller margins.
This finding is reinforced by two facts observed elsewhere. First, a poll
conducted on election day12 asked at what moment voters had decided to vote
for a particular candidate. Their hesitancy in making a choice is reflected in
12by TNS Sofres - Unilog Groupe Logica CMG, April 22, 2007, the same poll cited earlier.
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the answers: 33% decided in the last week, a third of whom (11%) decided on
election day itself. For Bayrou voters 43% decided in the last week and 12%
on election day; for Sarkozy voters the numbers were 20% and 6%; for Royal
voters, 28% and 9%; for Le Pen voters, 43% and 18%. But the “first-past-the-
post” system forced them to make a choice (or to vote for no one)! Second,
the Faches-Thumesnil experimenters [11] asked voters to rank-order all twelve
candidates. They were testing “single-transferable-vote” mechanisms.13 Rank-
ordering fewer than twelve meant that those not ranked were all considered to
be placed at the bottom of the list (so the mechanisms could not “transfer”
votes to such candidates). 960 voters participated, only 60% of those who voted
officially, and 67 ballots were invalid. Only 41% of the valid ballots actually
rank-ordered all twelve candidates. 53% rank-ordered six or fewer candidates,
29% of them rank-ordered three or fewer. All of this bespeaks of a reluctance
to rank-order many candidates: it is a difficult, time-consuming task.
The evidence conclusively demonstrates two facts. (1) The “first-past-the-
post” system forces voting for one candidate when in fact many voters do not
wish to make a single choice. (2) The age-old view of voting (and the basic
assumption of the traditional model of social choice theory)—that voters have
rank-orders of the candidates in their minds—is not a reasonable model of re-
ality.
Of the 1,733 valid majority judgement ballots,14 1,705 were different. It
is surprising they were not all different! Had all those who voted in France
in 2007 (some 36 million) cast different majority judgement ballots, less than
1.7% of the possible messages would have been used. Those that were the same
among the 1,733 valid ballots (or messages) of the experiment contained only to
Reject ’s or were of the type an Excellent for Sarkozy and to Reject for all the
other candidates. The opinions of voters are richer, more varied and complex by
many orders of magnitude than those they are allowed to express by all current
systems!
The outcome of voting by majority judgement in the three precincts is given
in table 10. Since every candidate was necessarily assigned a grade—assigning
no grade meant assigning a to Reject—each candidate had exactly the same
number of grades. Accordingly, the results may be given as percentages of the
grades received by each candidate. In fact, there were relatively few ballots
that assigned no grade to a candidate15 (even though no grade explicitly meant
to Reject). Most close observers of French politics who were shown the results
with the names of the candidates hidden were able to correctly identify Sarkozy,
Royal, Bayrou and Le Pen.
13These elect the candidate who is ranked first by a majority. If there is no such candidate,
then candidates are eliminated, one by one, their votes “transferred” to the next on the lists,
until a candidate is ranked first by a majority. The choice of who to eliminate may differ. One
mechanism eliminates the candidate ranked first least often; another eliminates the candidate
ranked last most often. In the experiment the first elected Sarkozy, the second elected Bayrou.
14559 in the 1st precinct, 601 in the 2nd, 573 in the 3rd.
15No grade was assigned to each of the candidates in the following percentages: Nihous
7.2%, Schrivardi 5.8%, Laguiller 5.3%, Villiers 4.3%, Buffet 4.3%, Voynet 4.3%, Bove´ 4.2%
Besancenot 3.2%, Bayrou 2.9%, Le Pen 2.7%, Royal 1.8%, Sarkozy 1.7%.
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Excellent Very Good Good Acceptable Poor to Reject
Besancenot 4.1% 9.9% 16.3% 16.0% 22.6% 31.1%
Buffet 2.5% 7.6% 12.5% 20.6% 26.4% 30.4%
Schivardi 0.5% 1.0% 3.9% 9.5% 24.9% 60.4%
Bayrou 13.6% 30.7% 25.1% 14.8% 8.4% 7.4%
Bove´ 1.5% 6.0% 11.4% 16.0% 25.7% 39.5%
Voynet 2.9% 9.3% 17.5% 23.7% 26.1% 20.5%
Villiers 2.4% 6.4% 8.7% 11.3% 15.8% 55.5%
Royal 16.7% 22.7% 19.1% 16.8% 12.2% 12.6%
Nihous 0.3% 1.8% 5.3% 11.0% 26.7% 55.0%
Le Pen 3.0% 4.6% 6.2% 6.5% 5.4% 74.4%
Laguiller 2.1% 5.3% 10.2% 16.6% 25.9% 40.1%
Sarkozy 19.1% 19.8% 14.3% 11.5% 7.1% 28.2%
Table 10. Majority judgement results, three precincts of Orsay, April 22, 2007.
The percentage in bold in the row of a candidate indicates the column of
her/his majority-grade.
The majority-grade of a candidate is his or her median grade. It is simulta-
neously the highest grade approved by a majority and the lowest grade approved
by a majority. For example, Dominique Voynet’s majority-grade (see table 10)
is Acceptable because a majority of 2.9%+9.3%+17.5%+23.7% = 53.4% believe
she merits at least that grade and a majority of 23.7%+26.1%+20.5% = 70.3%
believe she merits at most that grade.
The majority-ranking orders the candidates according to their majority-
grades. However, with twelve candidates and six grades some candidates will
necessarily have the same majority-grade. The general theory [2, 4] shows that
two candidates are never tied for a place in the majority-ranking unless the
two have precisely the same set of grades. But when there are many voters,
as is typical in most elections, the general rule for determining the majority-
ranking may be simplified. Three values attached to a candidate—called the
candidate’s majority-value—are sufficient to determine the candidate’s place in
the majority-ranking:
(p, α, q) where


p = % of grades above majority-grade,
α = majority-grade, and
q = % of grades below majority-grade.
A mnemonic helps to make the definition of this order clear: supplement a
majority-grade (other than Excellent or to Reject) by a “mention” of ± or 0




α+ if p > q,
α0 if p = q
α− if p < q,
(the possibility that p = q is slim). Thus, for example, Sarkozy’s majority-value
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is (38.9%,Good , 46.9%) and his majority-grade* is Good−. Naturally, α+ is
better than α0, and both are better than α−.
Consider two candidates A and B with majority-values (pA, αA, qA) and
(pB , αB , qB). A ranks ahead of B, and (pA, αA, qA) ahead of (pB , αB , qB), when





• their majority-grade*’s are both α+ and pA > pB , or
• their majority-grade*’s are both α− and qA < qB .
To illustrate,
• Bayrou with (44.3%,Good+,30.6%) ranks ahead of Royal with
(39.4%,Good−,41.5%) because Good+ is better than Good−,
• Besancenot with (46.3%,Poor+,31.2%) ranks ahead of Buffet with
(43.2%,Poor+,30.5%) because 46.3% > 43.2%, and
• Royal with (39.4%,Good−,41.5%) ranks ahead of Sarkozy with
(38.9%,Good−,46.9%) because 41.5% < 46.9%.
It is practically certain that this rule for deciding the order among the
majority-values suffices to give an unambiguous order of finish in any election
with many voters. A more detailed discussion of tie-breaking rules is given in
the appendix.
p = α∗ = q =
Majority- Above The Below Natl. Orsay
ranking maj.-grade majority-grade* maj.-grade rank. rank.
1st Bayrou 44.3% Good+ 30.6% 3rd 3rd
2nd Royal 39.4% Good− 41.5% 2nd 1st
3rd Sarkozy 38.9% Good− 46.9% 1st 2nd
4th Voynet 29.8% Acceptable− 46.6% 8th 7th
5th Besancenot 46.3% Poor+ 31.2% 5th 5th
6th Buffet 43.2% Poor+ 30.5% 7th 8th
7th Bove´ 34.9% Poor− 39.4% 10th 9th
8th Laguiller 34.2% Poor− 40.0% 9th 10th
9th Nihous 45.0% to Reject – 11th 11th
10th Villiers 44.5% to Reject – 6th 6th
11th Schivardi 39.7% to Reject – 12th 12th
12th Le Pen 25.7% to Reject – 4th 4th
Table 11. The majority-values (p, α, q) and the majority-ranking,
three precincts of Orsay, April 22, 2007.
(The column headed “Natl. rank.” is the national rank-order according to the current
system. The column headed “Orsay rank.” is the rank-order in the three precincts of Orsay
according to the current system.)
The majority-grades and the majority-values for the experiment are given
in the order of the majority-ranking in table 11. The majority-ranking is very
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different from the rank-ordering obtained in the three precincts of Orsay with
the current system. Sarkozy had the highest number of Excellents, but also
the highest number of to Rejects among the three serious candidates. Every
grade of the candidates counts in determining their majority-grades and the
majority-ranking. This explains why Bayrou—third according to the official
vote in Orsay’s three precincts—is first according to the majority judgement.
Le Pen—fourth according to the official vote—is last according to the majority
judgement because 74.4% of the voters graded him to Reject. Whenever a
majority of the voters assigns a same grade to a candidate, that is necessarily the
candidate’s majority-grade. Another marked difference with the current system
is the green candidate Voynet’s fourth-placed finish (instead of seventh-placed):
the electorate was able to express the importance it attaches to problems of the
environment while giving higher grades to candidates it judged better able to
preside the nation. Once elected, Sarkozy recognized this importance: his new
government has one “super-ministry,” the Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable
Development.
Notice that the “raw” majority judgement results make a very strong case for
ranking Bayrou first, Royal second and Sarkozy third for the following reason.
Except for the Excellents, whose percentages taken alone give the opposite rank-
ordering, the percentages of at least Very Good, at least Good, . . . , at least Poor,
all agree with that order (see table 12). Practically any reasonable election
mechanism will agree with this ranking of the three important candidates.
At least
Excellent Very Good Good Acceptable Poor to Reject
Bayrou 13.6% 43.3% 69.4% 84.2% 92.6% 100%
Royal 16.7% 39.4% 58.5% 75.3% 87.5% 100%
Sarkozy 19.1% 38.9% 53.2% 64.7% 71.8% 100%
Table 12. Cumulative majority judgement grades, three precincts of Orsay,
April 22, 2007.
Validation
The result of the second round on May 6, 2007, in the three voting precincts of
Orsay was
Se´gole`ne Royal: 51.3% Nicolas Sarkozy: 48.7%
The results of the face-to-face confrontations between every pair of candi-
dates may be estimated from the majority judgement ballots16 by comparing
their respective grades (see table 13). In particular, Royal defeats Sarkozy with
52.3% of the vote, a “prediction” of the outcome of the second round within 1%.
The participants seem to have expressed themselves in the majority judgement
ballots in conformity with the manner in which they actually voted. The 1%
difference is easily explained. 26% of the voters did not participate in the exper-
iment; and the last two weeks of the campaign may have changed perceptions.
16The information in table 10 does not suffice.
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The closeness of the estimate to the outcome shows the majority judgement
ballots are consistent with the observed facts.
The estimates of table 13 show Bayrou to be the Condorcet-winner, which
is consistent with all polls. Moreover, the estimates of the face-to-face races
determine an unambiguous order of finish—it is the order given in the table—so
there is no Condorcet-cycle. This order is almost the majority-ranking: only Ni-
hous and Villiers are permuted (their respective majority-values are (45.0%,to
Reject,–) and (44.5%,to Reject,–), very close). The information in the table
suffices to compute the Borda-scores of each candidate (the sum of the percent-
ages in each of their rows): Bayrou 867, Royal 812, Sarkozy 711, Voynet 634,
Besancenot 581, Buffet 552, Bove´ 486, Laguiller 481, Villiers 430, Nihous 369,
Schivardi 335, Le Pen 342. The Condorcet and Borda orders of finish are the
same except for the last two candidates.
Bay Roy Sar Voy Bes Buf Bov Lag Vil Nih Sch LP
Bayrou – 56 60 77 77 81 83 83 84 90 90 86
Royal 44 – 52 73 74 78 81 80 77 85 87 81
Sarkozy 40 48 – 59 61 64 66 66 77 75 75 80
Voynet 23 27 41 – 56 59 67 67 66 75 79 74
Besancenot 23 26 39 44 – 53 60 61 62 69 74 70
Buffet 19 22 36 41 47 – 57 59 61 68 73 69
Bove´ 17 19 34 33 40 43 – 51 56 62 66 65
Laguiller 17 20 34 33 39 41 49 – 56 62 66 64
Villiers 16 23 23 34 38 39 44 44 – 54 56 59
Nihous 10 15 25 25 31 32 38 38 46 – 53 56
Schivardi 10 13 25 21 26 27 34 34 44 47 – 54
Le Pen 14 19 20 26 30 31 35 36 41 44 46 –
Table 13. Face-to-face elections, percentages of votes estimated from majority
judgement ballots, three precincts of Orsay, April 22, 2007.
It shows, for example, Royal winning 52% of the vote against Sarkozy and, symmetrically,
Sarkozy winning 48% of the vote against Royal. The percentage of ballots that give to both
candidates of a pair the same grade is split evenly between them.
Major Leftist Rightist
Bay Roy Sar Voy Bes Buf Bov Lag Sch Vil Nih LP
Estimate 1 25.6 25.6 28.4 3.5 4.9 2.6 1.6 1.6 0.4 2.3 0.5 2.9
Actual 25.5 29.9 29.0 1.7 2.5 1.4 0.9 0.8 0.2 1.9 0.3 5.9
Estimate 2 25.3 25.4 27.4 3.4 4.6 2.5 1.5 1.5 0.3 1.9 0.4 5.8
Table 14. First round vote, percentages of votes estimated from majority
judgement ballots, three precincts of Orsay, April 22, 2007.
(In estimate 1, the percentage of ballots that give to several candidates the same highest
grade is split evenly among them. In estimate 2, the same assumption is made except when
Le Pen is one of the several candidates, in which case he is accorded the entire percentage.)
The majority judgement ballots may also be used to estimate the extent of
deliberate strategic voting (not in accord with voters’ convictions) in the first
round under the current system (see table 14). It is naturally assumed that a
candidate receiving the highest grade accorded by a voter would receive his or
her one vote. But since a third of the voters gave their highest grade to more
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than one candidate, an assumption must be made concerning their behavior.
Estimate 1 naively assumes such votes are split evenly among the candidates
receiving the highest grade. Estimate 2 takes into account Le Pen’s very peculiar
niche in the far right of the French political spectrum: it assumes that when a
voter’s highest grade goes to Le Pen and others, then her or his vote goes to
Le Pen only (if you vote far right it is more strategic to vote for Le Pen, but
why not add the others if you can!). This second assumption explains almost
perfectly what happened to the far right, and seems to be the better model.
Comparing estimate 2 with the actual vote suggests that 6.3% of the 13.8% for
the six candidates of the left and greens (so a little less than half of their votes
according to estimate 2) went to Royal and Sarkozy, three-quarters of them for
Royal, one-quarter for Sarkozy. Contrary to the stated opinions of most political
observers, it seems that Bayrou voters backed him by conviction not strategy.
It happens that the majority judgement winner coincides with the Cordorcet-
winner and the Borda-winner. It also happens that the majority-ranking almost
coincides with the unambiguous order of the face-to-face winners: only the 9th
and 10th placed candidates (Nihous and de Villiers) are interchanged. And the
majority judgement coincides with the Borda-ranking as well except for one
more interchange in the last two places (Le Pen and Schivardi). When elections
are really clear cut affairs, most reasonable mechanisms may be expected to
give close to the same results. Table 12 explains why the first three finish in
that order according to the majority judgement, as well as by Condorcet’s and
Borda’s methods.
Roy Sar Bay LP Bes Vil Voy Bov Buf Lag Nih Sch
12th prct. 32.0 26.6 20.2 10.0 2.7 2.5 2.3 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.2 0.0
National 31.2 25.9 18.6 10.4 4.1 2.2 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.2 0.3
Sar Roy Bay LP Bes Vil Buf Voy Bov Lag Nih Sch
Table 15. Actual percentages, first round, April 22, 2007, in Orsay’s 12th
precinct (top row of percentages with names of candidates above) and all of
France (bottom row of percentages with names of candidates below).
Some persons have averred that the majority judgement necessarily favors
centrist candidates. This is neither true in theory nor in practice, despite the
fact that Bayrou was a centrist candidate. First, observe that Bayrou’s share
of the vote was considerably higher in the three precincts of Orsay than in the
entire nation: winning in Orsay’s three precincts implies little about what might
have happened nationally. Second, consider the actual first round percentage
results in the 12th precinct. They were close to the result in all of France (when
the percentages of Royal and Sarkozy are permuted and Buffet is moved up two
slots in the order of finish, see table 15).
Bayrou was as much a centrist candidate in the 12th precinct as he was
in the three precincts. Yet, in the 12th precinct Bayrou was not the majority
judgement winner (see table 16 for the results of the four major candidates):
Royal is first, Bayrou second, Sarkozy third, and Le Pen last. In practice and
in theory a candidate receives a high majority-grade when he or she is assigned
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many high grades and few low grades: this is no more reserved to a centrist
candidate than to any other candidate. 42.4% of Royal’s grades were above
Good, only 40.8% of Bayrou’s were above Good.
p = α∗ = q =
Majority- Above The Below
ranking maj.-grade majority-grade* maj.-grade
1st Royal 42.4% Good+ 40.1%
2nd Bayrou 40.8% Good+ 31.4%
3rd Sarkozy 38.0% Good− 48.7%
12th Le Pen 30.9% to Reject –
Table 16. The majority-values (p, α, q) and the majority-ranking, Orsay’s 12th
precinct, April 22, 2007.17
Bayrou Royal Sarkozy Le Pen
Bayrou – 53.5% 59.0% 82.8%
Royal 46.5% – 54.3% 77.9%
Sarkozy 41.0% 45.7% – 77.7%
Le Pen 17.2% 22.1% 22.3% –
Table 17. Projected second round results, Orsay’s 12th precinct. (E.g.,
Sarkozy has 41% of the votes against Bayrou.)
The results of the face-to-face confrontations between the pairs of major
candidates deduced from the majority judgement ballots in the 12th precinct are
given for the four major candidates in table 17. Bayrou is again the Condorcet-
winner despite Royal’s majority judgement victory: Why?
Excllnt Very Gd Good Accptbl Poor to Rejct
Bayrou’s by Royal 7% 33% 29% 16% 9% 6%
grades by Sarkozy 6% 28% 30% 19% 9% 8%
Sarkozy’s by Royal 3% 10% 16% 15% 11% 45%
grades by Bayrou 6% 22% 24% 17% 6% 25%
Royal’s by Bayrou 7% 26% 26% 20% 13% 9%
grades by Sarkozy 3% 13% 22% 24% 18% 21%
Table 18. Grades given to three major candidates by voters who gave their
highest grade to one of the others, from majority judgement ballots, three
precincts of Orsay, April 22, 200718 (e.g., “by Royal” means by those voters
who gave their highest grade to Royal).
17The majority-grades and the majority-ranking of the candidates after Sarkozy is the same
as for the three precincts except that Besancenot obtains a Poor−, and de Villiers is placed
9th and Nihous 10th. Some may dispute ranking Royal above Bayrou. For a discussion see
the appendix where several tie-breaking rules are discussed.
18A Tnes-Sofres poll of March 14-15, 2007 showed 72% of Royal voters (respectively, 75% of
Sarkozy voters) giving their votes to Bayrou in a second round against Sarkozy (respectively,
against Royal).
17
The reason is clear enough. Bayrou was the second choice of a very large
number of voters, so against Royal alone in the current system he would natu-
rally take a large number of Sarkozy’s votes and against Sarkozy alone he would
naturally take a large number of Royal’s votes. The majority judgement ballots
show that the voters who gave Sarkozy their highest grade strongly preferred
Bayrou to Royal, those who gave Royal their highest grade strongly preferred
Bayrou to Sarkozy, whereas those who gave their highest grade to Bayrou eval-
uated Royal and Sarkozy about equally (see table 18).
Face-to-face confrontations ignore how the electorate evaluates the respective
candidates (just as the 2002 run-off ignored the respective evaluations of Chirac
and Le Pen) except, of course, that one is evaluated higher than the other. Two
thirds of the second highest grades are merely Good or worse (see table 19).
This is why being second in the rankings of voters has very different meanings.
Grades: Excellent Very Good Good Acceptable Poor to Reject
Highest 52% 37% 9% 2% 0% 1%
Second highest – 35% 41% 16% 5% 3%
Third highest – – 26% 40% 22% 13%
Table 19. Distributions highest grade, second highest grade, third highest
grade, three precincts of Orsay, April 22, 2007.
First ranked candidates (such as Sarkozy and Royal) often elicit strong sup-
port and strong opposition. Second ranked candidates are often centrists (such
as Bayrou). In consequence, a second ranked candidate is often favored in
face-to-face confrontations, so is favored by Condorcet’s method. Such centrist
candidates are even more favored by Borda’s method: when there are many mar-
ginal candidates of the right and the left, the second ranked candidates garner
many Borda points because they are ahead of most of them. But this is not true
with the majority judgement: the evaluations—the grades of the second ranked
candidates—decide, not the place in the ranking. The Condorcet-winner—never
used as a mechanism of election—and Borda’s method—almost never used—are
highly suspect for this among other reasons.
The closeness of the actual results in Orsay’s 12th precinct to the national
results (when Sarkozy takes the place of Royal) suggests that Sarkozy could
have been first in the majority-ranking at the national level. The voting in the
1st precinct, where Bayrou did exceptionally well, reinforces this impression.
The actual first round percentages were Sarkozy 32.6%, Bayrou 29.4% and
Royal 25.2%, yet Sarkozy placed a very close second in the majority-ranking
to Bayrou’s first. The projected second round winners show Bayrou to be the
Condorcet-winner in this precinct as well.
Common language
The theoretical underpinnings of the majority judgement require that voters (or
judges, when the problem is to rank competitors or alternatives) evaluate the
candidates in a language of grades that is common to them all. Evaluations
18
should be absolute, not relative. Therefore the question to be confronted by
a voter must not suggest “how do you compare the candidates,” but instead
address “how do you evaluate each candidate.” The question posed and the
language of grades offered in the ballot must make this distinction clear. Polls
in the 2007 French presidential elections illustrate the point (see table 20). The
question on the left suggests an evaluation, the question on the right a compari-
son. The results show the well known fact that “yes” or “no” answers can yield
strikingly varying results as a function of the question posed.
Question: Question:
Would each of the following Do you personally wish each of the
candidates be a good following candidates to win the
President of France? presidential election?
Yes No Yes No
Bayrou 60% 36% 33% 48%
Sarkozy 59% 38% 29% 56%
Royal 49% 48% 36% 49%
Le Pen 12% 84%
Table 20. Polling results, March 20 and 22, 2007 (Bva).
What constitutes a “good” common language, how is one to test whether
a language of grades or of measurement is “good,” and, indeed, why can one
assume that a common language exists at all?
Common languages assuredly do exist because they have been routinely in-
vented, learned through use, and commonly understood in a host of applications,
including ranking figure skaters, gymnasts, divers, pianists, wines and students
(these and other practical uses of common languages of measurement are inves-
tigated in [4]). In particular, the Chopin International Piano Competition has
used a number scale since its establishment in 1927 (though the range of the
numbers has changed over time). Schools and universities either give number
grades or letter grades together with their numerical “equivalents.”
The numbers, of course, are abstract and mean nothing until they are de-
fined. The “natural” language of words are their definitions. Using numbers
suggests that the mechanism for amalgamating the grades of many judges will
be to take their sum or average (as has the Chopin competition since 1927),
and may well induce judges or voters (or teachers and professors) to assign the
grades strategically in view of their ultimate use. For this reason it is better to
choose a “natural” language, although repeated use eventually converts num-
bers into words that have well-defined meanings (e.g., when a professional judge
says a dive in an international competition is an “8.5,” all of his or her peers
will know exactly what that means, whether they agree or not).
Finding a language of grades that is common to all the voters in a society
is less easy since it must be understood the first time it is used. France mainly
uses a 0 to 20 grading systems in its schools and universities, but it also uses the
six descriptive words of the majority judgement ballots (with the exception of to
Reject), words familiar to all French school children. A “good” language should
19
contain a sufficient number of grades to enable voters to express themselves as
fully as they wish, which argues in favor of a language with many grades. It
should also be common to all voters—that is, be used and understood “in the
same way” by all voters—which argues for a language with few grades. The
choice that was made in this experiment appears to have been judicious for
several reasons.
First, all of the grades were used a significant number of times (see table 8).
Second, six grades were sufficient, for only 14% of all the voters used all six
grades, suggesting that more grades would have been used by very few. 73%
used four or five grades, and the average was 4.5 grades per ballot (see table 9).
Three 1st 6th 12th Samples of 100 Disjoint samples of 50
prcts. prct. prct. prct. Avg. (σ) Range Avg. (σ) Range
Excellent 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 (.07) 0.6/0.8 0.7 (.12) 0.5/0.9
Very Good 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.2 (.13) 1.1/1.5 1.3 (.16) 1.1/1.5
Good 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.5 (.13) 1.4/1.7 1.5 (.27) 0.9/1.8
Acceptable 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 (.15) 1.7/2.1 1.7 (.27) 2.1/2.6
Poor 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.3 (.19) 2.1/2.7 2.3 (.19) 2.1/2.6
to Reject 4.6 4.8 4.6 4.3 4.5 (.29) 4.1/4.8 4.5 (.41) 4.1/5.3
Table 21. Average number of words per majority judgement ballot, 2007 Orsay
experiment. (σ is the standard deviation. 10 random samples of 100 and 10
disjoint random samples of 50 were taken.)
Third, it is possible to test whether the six “words” used in this experiment
constituted a “common” language or did not. The idea is to ask whether the
voters used the language in the same way: Did subsets of the voters use each
of the words on average about the same number of times? One approach to
answering this question is to compare the use of the words in the ballots coming
from the naturally defined subsets that are the voting precincts. Another is
to take random samples—or random disjoint samples—from among the 1,733
ballots. Table 21 shows that each of the three voting precincts—the 1st with
559 voters, the 6th with 601 voters, and the 12th with 573 voters—used the
language in almost exactly the same way, which of course agreed with the use
of the language by the entire population. It also suggests that similar results
obtain when random subsets of 100 and when random disjoint subsets of 50 are
chosen from the 1,733 ballots. A more detailed analysis takes many random
samples of k voters and studies the distribution of the average number of words
per ballot for different values of k [4]. This is quite remarkable: the outcomes
in the different precincts are different—and the outcomes on different samples
are different—but the use of the language is the same.
Fourth, the estimates of the second round results based on the majority
judgement ballots in the three precincts together and in each of them singly were
close to the observed outcomes as well, as shown in table 22. They assumed:
(1) when a voter gave a higher grade to one candidate over the other he or
she would vote for that candidate in the second round; and (2) when voters
gave the same grades to several candidates their votes were split equally among
those candidates. The closeness of the estimates to the observed outcomes
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suggests these assumptions were well founded, implying the language permitted
the voters to correctly express their preferences and their indifferences.
Three precincts 1st precinct 6th precinct 12th precinct
Estm. Outcm. Estm. Outcm. Estm. Outcm. Estm. Outcm.
Royal 52.3% 51.3% 48.2% 47.2% 54.4% 53.7% 54.3% 52.6%
Sarkozy 47.3% 48.7% 51.8% 52.8% 45.6% 46.3% 45.7% 47.4%
Table 22. Second round results, percentages of votes estimated from first round
majority judgement ballots vs. actual outcomes, Orsay, April 22, 2007.19
Properties of the majority judgement
Given a common language, the majority judgement—the majority-grade and
the majority-ranking—has been proven to be the only mechanism that is ac-
ceptable according to several different criteria (see [2, 4] for precise definitions
and results). Here we only describe and illustrate the salient properties that are
enjoyed by the majority judgement in the context of the experiment. All of the
other mechanisms mentioned in this article violate several of these properties.
Ordinal. The common language is ordinal, so the mechanism used must be
ordinal as well. The majority judgement is ordinal. Mechanisms based on sums
or averages of points are not ordinal.
Respects majority judgement. The majority-grade (or median) is the
unique mechanism which guarantees that when a majority of the electorate gives
a grade g to a candidate, that candidate’s majority-grade is g. Everyone of a
majority can give a point score of p to a candidate, but that candidate’s average
will certainly not (in general) be p.
Transitive. The majority-ranking is transitive; moreover, one candidate
is necessarily ranked ahead or behind another, unless both have identical sets
of grades. The Condorcet-paradox shows that the Condorcet criterion is not
transitive. Identifying instances where it has occurred in practice is rare because
of lack of information, but it has been observed [17].
Satisfies IIA. The majority judgement satisfies independence of irrelevant
alternatives. The grades are absolute not relative, so if some candidate drops
out, the remaining candidates’ grades remain the same. None of the mechanisms
whose inputs are rank-orders satisfy IIA (including first-past-the-post, Borda’s
and its generalizations to scoring systems, and the single transferable vote).
Monotone. If every grade of a candidate is replaced by the same or a
better grade, the candidate’s place in the majority-ranking cannot be lower.
If every grade of a candidate is replaced by a strictly better grade, the candi-
date’s majority-grade must be raised. Monotonicity is not satisfied by the single
transferable vote: if a winning candidate C is raised in the lists of some voters
but otherwise the lists remain the same, C may no longer be the winner. Nor
19Royal’s scores are consistently though slightly over estimated. This probably reflects
changes in opinions in the two weeks that separated the two rounds of voting (due, in partic-
ular, to the televised debate between the two candidates).
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is it satisfied by the French first-past-the-post with run-off system: if in 2007
Sarkozy’s first round vote had increased at the expense of Royal, Bayrou could
have finished second, the run-off would have been between Sarkozy and Bayrou,
and Bayrou would (might) have won.
Resists strategic manipulation. Take a candidate, say Se´gole`ne Royal,
whose majority-value is
(39.4%,Good , 41.5%).
Only a voter who can change Royal’s majority-grade or majority-value by chang-
ing the grades they give her can have any strategic impact. Who are those voters
and what are their motivations to change?
Suppose a voter believes a candidate merits a grade of g and the further the
majority-grade is from g the less she or he likes it (a reasonable motivation20).
Then the voter’s optimal voting strategy is to give the candidate the grade g: the
majority judgement is strategy-proof-in-grading21. Why is easy to see. 39.4% of
the voters believe Royal merits above Good, 19.1% that she merits Good, 41.5%
that she merits below Good. If a voter believes she merits better than Good,
suppose it is a Very Good : giving a still higher grade can change nothing in the
majority-value; giving a lower grade can only lower (a tiny bit) the majority-
value, which is not the voter’s intent. If a voter believes she merits worse than
Good, suppose it is an Acceptable: giving a still lower grade can again change
nothing; giving a higher grade can only raise (a tiny bit) the majority-value,
which is not the voter’s intent. If a voter believes Royal merits a Good, giving
a higher or lower grade can only raise or lower (a tiny bit) her majority-value,
which is not the voter’s intent. Q.E.D.
Similar reasoning shows that the majority-grade mechanism is group strategy-
proof-in-grading : a group of voters that share the same beliefs (e.g., they belong
to a same political party) have the same optimal strategy, namely, to give to the
candidates the grades they believe they merit. For if they believed Royal mer-
ited better than Good and all raised the grade they gave her, her majority-value
would remain the same; if all lowered the grades they gave her, her majority-
value would decrease and perhaps her majority-grade as well (not their intent).
If they believed Royal merited worse than Good and all lowered the grades they
gave her, her majority-value would remain the same; if all raised the grades they
gave her, her majority-value would increase and perhaps her majority-grade as
well (not their intent). If, finally, they believed she merited a Good, and all ei-
ther raised or lowered the grades they gave her, her majority-value and perhaps
her majority-grade as well would either increase or decrease (not their intent).
These “strategy-proof-in-grading” properties are certainly not true of any
mechanism based on sums or averages of points, nor of Borda’s and its deriv-
atives. If any voter either raises or lowers the points given a candidate—or
raises or lowers a candidate’s place in the voter’s list—, that candidate’s sum or
average increases or decreases (a tiny bit)—and the candidate may be raised or
lowered in the final ranking. And if many voters either raise or lower the points
20The voter’s preferences in grading are said to be “single-peaked.”
21In an entirely different context a related technical result is proved in [21].
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given a candidate—or raise or lower a candidate’s place in their lists—that can-
didate’s sum or average increases or decreases a lot—and the candidate is very
likely to be raised or lowered in the final ranking.
The strategy of a voter may, however, focus on the final ranking of the
candidates rather than on the their final grades. It is impossible to completely
eliminate the possibility of strategic manipulation if a voter is prepared for a
candidate’s final grade to be either above or below what she or he thinks the
candidate merits: there is no mechanism that is “strategy-proof-in-ranking.”22
But the majority judgement best resists such manipulation. Take the example of
Bayrou with a Good+ and Royal with a Good−, their respective majority-values
being,
Bayrou: (44.3%,Good,30.6%) Royal: (39.4%,Good,41.5%).
How could a voter who wished Royal to be ranked higher than Bayrou manipu-
late? By changing the grades assigned to try to lower Bayrou’s majority-value
and to raise Royal’s majority-value. But the majority judgement is partially
strategy-proof-in-ranking : those voters who can lower Bayrou’s majority-value
cannot raise Royal’s, those who can raise Royal’s majority-value cannot lower
Bayrou’s. For suppose such a voter can lower Bayrou’s. Then he or she must
have given Bayrou a Good or better: but having preferred Royal to Bayrou
the voter gave a grade of better than Good to Royal, so he or she cannot raise
Royal’s majority-value. Symmetrically, a voter who can raise Royal’s majority-
value must have given to her a Good or worse, so to Bayrou a worse than Good,
so the voter cannot lower Bayrou’s majority-value. Compared with mechanisms
that sum or average, the majority judgement cuts in half the possibility of ma-
nipulation, however bizarre a voter’s motivations (or whatever may be a voter’s
utility function).
As a matter of fact, 32.9% of the voters gave a higher grade to Royal than
to Bayrou. Their types are summarized in table 23. The 9.2% of voters of type
A—who gave an Excellent or Very Good to Royal and an Acceptable or worse to
Bayrou—can do nothing to raise Royal’s majority-value or to lower Bayrou’s.
On the other hand, if all of the types C, D and F lowered Bayrou’s grade to
Acceptable (it serves no purpose to lower them further) then his majority-value
would go below Royal’s. But that is unlikely, because most voters prefer voting
in accord with their convictions (especially when they are asked to give absolute
evaluations of candidates rather than relative comparisons).
A more reasonable scenario would be: one-quarter of the type B voters, who
gave a mere Acceptable to Royal, raise her grade up to Very Good (more is
of no use); one-third of the types C, D and E, who see only a slight difference
between Royal and Bayrou, change (but more than indicated in table 23 is of no
use); and one-half of the types F and G, who see a more substantial difference
between the two candidates, change (again, more than indicated in table 23 is
of no use). This scenario implies that 38% of the Royal voters who are able to
have an impact by giving grades strategically do so (by way of comparison, a
22In the context of the traditional model, this is the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.
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poll on election day showed 31% of Royal supporters voted strategically). The
result is to change the candidates’ majority-values to
Bayrou: (42.2%,Good,36.6%) Royal: (42.0%,Good,40.8%),
so both have the majority-grade* Good+, but Bayrou remains ahead in the
majority-ranking. This shows how the majority judgement resists manipulation;
it also shows that the amount of useful exaggeration is in any case limited. In
contrast, mechanisms based on summing (including Borda’s) or averaging points
share none of the safeguards against manipulation discussed above.
Type % Excell - Very Good Accep- Poor To Strategic
ballots ent Good table Reject change
A 9.2% R R B B B cannot
B 2.8% | ← ← ←R B B 1/4
C 6.3% R B→ → → | 1/3
D 6.9% R B→ → | 1/3
E 2.4% | ← ←R B 1/3
F 3.2% R B→ → | 1/2
G 2.1% | ← ←R B B 1/2
Table 23. Strategic voting: could Royal have won in Orsay’s three precincts?
(Type A voters, for example, gave an Excellent or Very Good to Royal, an
Acceptable or worse to Bayrou. The arrows indicate increases and decreases in
grades; the bar | that no purpose is served by going further.)
Voters’ utilities. In theory the motivations of voters and their satisfac-
tion are modelled by their “utilities.” The utility function of a voter is at once
complex and completely unknown. It is plausible to imagine that a voter would
like a candidate’s final grade to be as close as possible to the grade he or she
believes the candidate merits, . . . but it ain’t necessarily so! In the “plausible”
case, the candidate’s utility function is absolute, otherwise it becomes relative,
i.e., what counts are the candidates’ final rankings not their final grades. But in
any case, the majority judgement mechanism makes no assumptions whatever
about the voters’ utilities. It depends only on what can be known in prac-
tice. It is “strategy-proof” for large classes of reasonable utility functions, and,
when nothing is known about them, it best combats strategic manipulation, as
the above example shows. The fact that voters share a common language of
grades makes no assumptions about the voters’ utilities: utilities measure the
satisfactions of voters, grades measure the merits of candidates.
Grades for candidates. Voters who participated in the experiment were
delighted with the idea that the majority judgement assigns grades to candi-
dates. The majority-grade is a signal that expresses the electorate’s appreciation
of a candidate. Chirac’s “triumph” with over 82% of the vote in 2002 would have
been very different with the majority judgement. Chirac would have won, but
his grade would have been modest, Le Pen’s a to Reject. Voynet’s grade in the
2007 experiment clearly expresses the electorate’s concern with environmental
problems, whereas the official vote completely failed to do so. Le Pen’s grade in
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the 2007 experiment shows the electorate’s strong refusal of his ideas, whereas
according to the official vote he was one of the major candidates. Even when
there is exactly one candidate—which often occurs—the majority judgement
may be used to disclose the electorate’s evaluation of that candidate.
The majority judgement is grade-consistent in the following sense: if there
are two separate parts of an electorate and the majority-grade of a candidate
in each is a g, then the majority-grade of the candidate is a g in the whole
electorate as well. This idea is suggested by the following concept invented
[26] to characterize the scoring methods (that assign a fixed number of points
to each place in a voter’s ranking, such as Borda’s, or first-past-the-post). A
method is winner-consistent if the method used in each of two separate parts
of an electorate makes candidate C the winner, then the method used in the
whole electorate must make C the winner as well. The same idea may be used to
characterize the point summing methods [4]. But scoring (and point summing)
methods are all highly manipulable. The majority judgement is not winner-
consistent, and that is a good property: winning is a relative concept that puts
aside absolute evaluations and so opens the door to all the inconsistencies (the
different intensities of the two parts of the electorate should count!).
Every vote counts. A husband and wife with opposite opinions sometimes
skip voting since their votes “cancel each other out.” There are many situations
where one or a group of voters’ ballots cancel each other out if a mechanism
based on summing or averaging points or a scoring method is used. For ex-
ample, one voter gives the same number of points to opposing candidates; or
several voters give points to opposing candidates that sum to the same total;
or the inputs are rank-orders, and a group of voters places every candidate in
every slot of their rankings the same number of times. But this is not true of
the majority judgement: every grade contributes to the determination of the
majority-ranking (even when a voter gives the same grade to every candidate).
Moreover, whatever may be a voter’s grade or whatever may be the grades of a
group of voters, there exists a situation where the voter or the group of voters
is decisive, that is, counting the voter’s or the group of voter’s ballot(s) gives
one outcome, not counting it or them gives another outcome.23
Freedom of expression. Some critics have averred that a voter should
be forced to “make up his or her mind” by expressing a clear cut preference
between any two candidates. The first-past-the-post system has this property
(unless the voter abstains or hands in a blank ballot). Any mechanism in which
the input is a rank-order of the candidates forbids the voter from expressing any
intensity of preference: the second ranked candidate is only that, whatever the
voter’s evaluation. But why limit any voter’s freedom of expression? Shouldn’t
someone who sees no discernable difference between two or more candidates be
allowed to record this? Shouldn’t a voter who believes his or her second ranked
candidate is merely acceptable or worse be allowed to express this? The majority
judgement gives voters complete freedom of expression (within the bounds of
the language).
23See [2], or [4] for proofs.
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3 Other voting mechanisms
Approval voting
On April 21, in the first round of the French presidential election of 2002—well
before we had any inkling of even working on the general problem of electing
and ranking—one of us initiated an approval voting experiment,24 conducted
under the same general conditions as the experiment of 2007, in five of Orsay’s
twelve precincts25 and the one precinct of Gy-les-Nonains, a small country town
in Loiret. 2,597 of the 3,346 who voted officially (or 78%) participated in the
experiment, 2,587 ballots were valid.
Officially, voters were confronted with having to give their one vote to one
of sixteen candidates in the official vote. The ballot of the experiment consisted
of a list of the candidates together with instructions saying:
“Rules of approval voting. The elector votes by placing crosses [in
boxes corresponding to candidates]. He may place crosses for as
many candidates as he wishes, but not more than one per candidate.
The winner is the candidate with the most crosses.”
The instructions are deliberately neutral: no question is asked, no language is
suggested, the explanation is purely relative.26
On average the voters cast 3.15 crosses per ballot (the distribution is given
in table 24). The actual system offered voters 17 possible messages, approval
voting offered more than 65 thousand.27 Of the 2,587 valid ballots, 813 were
different. Voters expressed their relief at having the possibility of casting crosses
for as many candidates as they wished.
Crosses 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10/16
Ballots 36 287 569 783 492 258 94 40 16 6 6
% Ballots 1.4 11.1 22.0 30.3 19.0 10.0 3.6 1.5 0.6 0.2 0.2
Table 24. Number of ballots with k crosses, k = 0, 1, . . . , 16, approval voting
experiment, five voting precincts of Orsay and Gy-les-Nonains, first round,
April 21, 2002.
This experiment offered a rare opportunity to show that the expressed pref-
erences of voters are far from being “single-peaked” with regard to a left/right
political spectrum, i.e., there exists no alignment of the candidates by which
24The idea to experiment approval voting on a large scale in parallel with a presidential
election actually goes back to 1995, when Balinski and Laurant Mann prepared a basic plan,
but were too late to realize it. For a detailed account of the 2002 experiment see [5].
251st, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 12th.
26This is standard practice. The 2007 ballot for the election of the officers of the Society for
Social Choice and Welfare gives similarly neutral instructions: “You can vote for any number
of candidates by ticking the appropriate boxes.”
27With 16 candidates there are 216 = 65, 536 possible messages. With the majority judge-
ment there are 616 or some 2.8 trillion possible messages.
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a voter who most prefers any candidate C increasingly dislikes other candi-
dates the further they are from C in the alignment. For if there were such an
alignment, the total number of possible sincere messages—messages that are
consistent with the voters’ preferences—could be at most 137.28
The outcomes in the six voting precincts with approval voting and with
the official voting are given in table 25. The one significant difference between
them is that Le Pen is third in the official vote, eleventh in the approval vote
(otherwise, Laguiller moves up three places to behind Madelin and Bescancenot
moves up one place to behind Taubira). The four most important candidates—
Chirac, Le Pen, Jospin and Bayrou—all lost relative support in approval voting,
whereas every one of the minor candidates gained relative support. If Orsay and
Gy-les-Nonains were at all representative of France, the results of the experiment
showed that the indecision of the country—the lack of enthusiasm for any one
candidate or party—was even more extreme than the usual method of voting
indicated. No candidate received anywhere near a majority of the ballots (no
“legitimacy” is added to the first-placed candidate, contrary to the claims made
for approval voting [8]). Whereas we had entered into this experiment persuaded
by the usual “common sense” arguments that approval voting was a good idea,
the results left us with a distinct feeling that it is not a reasonable mechanism.
We did not know exactly why. Now we believe we do.29
% ballots with % of all Official vote
crosses crosses first round
Jospin 40.5% 12.9% 19.5%
Chirac 36.5% 11.6% 18.9%
Bayrou 33.5% 10.7% 9.9%
Cheve`nement 30.3% 9.6% 8.1%
Mame`re 28.9% 9.2% 7.9%
Madelin 21.3% 6.8% 5.0%
Taubira 18.9% 6.0% 3.2%
Lepage 17.9% 5.7% 2.8%
Besancenot 17.6% 5.6% 3.1%
Laguiller 15.4% 4.9% 3.7%
Le Pen 14.6% 4.6% 10.0%
Hue 11.5% 3.6% 2.7%
Saint-Josse 7.8% 2.5% 1.7%
Boutin 7.8% 2.5% 1.3%
Me´gret 7.7% 2.4% 1.3%
Gluckstein 4.3% 1.4% 0.8%
Total 314.6% 100% 100%
Table 25. Approval voting results, five precincts of Orsay and Gy-les-Nonains,
first round, April 21, 2002.
28The crosses would have to be consecutive with regard to the alignment: there are 16 such
messages with one cross, 15 with two, 14 with three, . . . , 1 with sixteen and 1 with none.
29For a different analysis of this experiment see [19].
27
The result of the second round on May 5, 2002 in the five precincts of Orsay
and the one of Gy-les-Nonains was
Jacques Chirac: 89.3% Jean-Maire Le Pen: 10.7%
The electorate’s will expressed by approval votes is not sufficient to “predict”
this outcome (nor therefore the result of any other face-to-face confrontation).
Crosses and no crosses do not communicate enough information. The problem is
the frequency with which voters assigned crosses to two candidates or no crosses
to two candidates (see table 26).30
Jospin Chirac Bayrou Mame`re Che´ve`nement Le Pen
Jospin – 34% 44% 75% 56% 48%
Chirac 34% – 66% 51% 54% 64%
Bayrou 44% 66% – 55% 60% 61%
Mame`re 75% 51% 55% – 52% 61%
Che´ve`nement 56% 54% 60% 52% – 54%
Le Pen 48% 64% 61% 61% 54% –
Table 26. Percentages of same votes (both crosses or both no crosses) to two
candidates, approval voting results, five precincts of Orsay and
Gy-les-Nonains, first round, April 21, 2002.
Three estimates of a face-to-face vote between Chirac and Le Pen were cal-
culated. In each, if a candidate has a cross and the other does not, the first is
given 1 vote, the second is given none. The first estimate gives 1
2
vote to each
candidate if both have crosses or neither do: giving crosses and giving no crosses
to both candidates means the voter is indifferent between them. This yields the
estimate
Jacques Chirac: 61% Jean-Maire Le Pen: 39%
The second estimate gives 1
2
vote to each if both have crosses, otherwise 0:
giving crosses to both candidates means indifference between them; zeros say
nothing concerning the two. This yields the estimate
Jacques Chirac: 79% Jean-Maire Le Pen: 21%
The last estimate gives no vote to each if both have crosses or both do not: no
indifference is deducible. This yields the estimate
Jacques Chirac: 80% Jean-Maire Le Pen: 20%
None of these estimates comes close to the actual result. Several crosses on a
voter’s approval ballot—and even more so, several no crosses—does not mean
the voter is indifferent among the corresponding candidates. This shows that
the approval voting mechanism does not permit the voters to correctly express
their preferences or their indifferences.
30The analyses are confined to the more important candidates.
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In this experiment approval voting was presented and appears to be a mech-
anism that simply adds crosses: implicitly the vote is relative, it asks voters
to make pair-by-pair comparisons. As a consequence, it invites strategic voting
and is for that reason subject to Arrow’s paradox. For if some candidates drop
out, voters may change their assignments of crosses. For example, a voter’s fa-
vorite candidate drops out so the voter gives a cross to a candidate to whom he
or she had not given a cross before. This may change the order-of-finish among
the remaining candidates. Circumstantial evidence for such behavior is given
below.
On the other hand, approval voting may be presented and viewed as a mecha-
nism that is a special case of the majority judgement when the common language
of grades consists of two words. When there are exactly two grades mathemat-
ically the approval voting ranking is the majority-ranking. But in this model,
in this perception of the process, the vote is absolute, it asks voters to eval-
uate the candidates. In this case the voter must be posed a question and be
offered a common language of words that make it clear the grades have absolute
meanings. This has not been the case in any of the theoretical discussions or ap-
plications of approval voting, where the question posed, the addition of crosses
and the analyses of results all suggest the point of view that what is important
is comparisons. Had anyone thought about crosses and no crosses as absolute
evaluations, they would (or should) have immediately pointed out that approval
voting is a mechanism that excludes Arrow’s paradox, so satisfies IIA!
The contrast between absolute evaluations and relative comparisons may be
seen in the very different questions posed in two 2007 polls (see above, table 20):
“Would each of the following candidates be a good President of France?” and
“Do you personally wish each of the following candidates to win the presidential
election?” The first poses an absolute question, the second a relative one. The
first invites an evaluation, the second suggests a contrast. The answers are,
in consequence, completely different. Significantly, the first question elicited a
“yes” for the four major candidates considerably more in keeping with their
Good or better grades in the 2007 majority judgement experience than did the
second question.
If a cross is interpreted as an “approve”—so implicitly no cross is inter-
preted as a “disapprove”—then the winning candidate in the 2002 experiment,
L. Jospin, is elected with a majority-grade of “disapprove,” for that is the will
of a majority of 59.5% of the electorate. It is unacceptable to elect a candidate
of whom a majority disapproves! More grades are needed.
The crosses, it turns out, were used in the same way by the voters: there
were on average 3.15 crosses per ballot over all six precincts, and about the same
number in each. This does not, however, imply that the two “words” constituted
a common language of absolute grades because usage includes strategic behavior,
and perhaps what was in common was the strategic behavior. The point is this:
if voters assign crosses because of absolute evaluations of the merits of candidates
then the language is common; otherwise, the language is not common. If the
behavior is absolute, Arrow’s paradox cannot arise; if it is not absolute, the
paradox can arise since the crosses assigned depend on the set of candidates.
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Another experiment that was conducted in 2007 in parallel with the first round
of the French presidential election provides data that allows a circumstantial
analysis of this issue.
The Baujard-Igersheim experiment [6] tested two mechanisms at once31—
approval voting (and a point-summing mechanism with points 0, 1 or 2, dis-
cussed below)—in six different voting precincts32 with 2,836 participants (62%
of those who voted officially). The approval voting ballot stated:
Instructions : You indicate, among the 12 candidates, those that
you support. To do so encircle the name of that or those candidates
whom you support. You may encircle one name, several names or
no name. . . The candidate elected with [this] method is the one who
receives the highest number of supports.
On average the voters cast 2.33 circles per ballot. Moreover, each of the six
precincts did approximately the same, so the circles were used in about the same
way by all voters. The outcomes over the six precincts are given in table 27.
Again, no candidate had circles in a majority of the ballots; again, the (four)
major candidates all lost relative support in approval voting whereas every one
of the others gained; again, as a language, the mechanism failed because the
winner’s grade—expressed by the majority—was “not support.”
% ballots with % of all Official vote
circles circles first round
Bayrou 49.7% 21.4% 23.0%
Sarkozy 45.2% 19.4% 34.1%
Royal 43.7% 18.8% 23.6%
Besancenot 23.7% 10.2% 4.1%
Voynet 16.9% 7.3% 2.1%
Le Pen 11.6% 5.0% 7.6%
Bove´ 11.5% 4.9% 1.1%
Laguiller 9.3% 4.0% 1.0%
Villiers 9.0% 3.9% 1.7%
Buffet 7.4% 3.2% 0.8%
Nihous 3.4% 1.5% 0.6%
Schivardi 1.4% 0.6% 0.3%
Table 27. Approval voting results, Illkirch, Louvigny and Cigne´, April 22, 2007
[6].
The analysis of the absolute vs. relative vote issue is based on the consider-
able information found in the majority judgement ballots. Since the language
is common to random samples of 50 or 100 voters from the three precincts in
31One ballot contained both. This permits analyses of potential interest. On the other
hand, the participants expressed themselves twice simultaneously, which may have induced
inter-dependencies.
32Three precincts in Illkirch (Alsace), two in Louvigny (Basse-Normandie) and one in Cigne´
(Mayenne).
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Orsay, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the distribution of grades is com-
mon to the voters anywhere in France (nota bene: the language is common,
not the evaluations of the candidates). In the approval voting experiment there
were 2.33 circles per ballot. If voting behavior was based on an absolute scale
only, then voters would cast circles either for the candidates deemed Excellent,
or those deemed Very Good or better, or Good or better, . . . But (see table
8) there are on average 0.69 Excellent ’s, 1.94 Very Good ’s or better, and 3.44
Good ’s or better: none of these agrees with 2.33, suggesting that the behavior
is not purely absolute.
Each majority judgement ballot assigns a grade to every candidate. The
highest grade is given to one or more candidates; the second highest to one or
more candidates; and so on down the list. Their averages may be computed
(see table 28): they are common to all three precincts as well. If voting be-
havior was based on a relative scale—assuming these averages are common to
all of France—then 2.33 should be about equal to 1.64, or 3.83, or . . . It isn’t,
suggesting that the behavior is not purely relative.
Grades: Three prcts. 1st prct. 6th prct. 12th prct.
Avg. no. highest 1.64 1.51 1.62 1.80
Avg. no. second highest 2.19 2.08 2.16 2.34
Avg. no. third highest 2.76 2.73 2.78 2.76
Table 28. Average number of highest, second highest, and third highest
grades, three precincts of Orsay, April 22, 2007.
Behavior in the 2007 approval voting experiment is better explained as a
mixture of absolute and relative behavior:
• a voter casts circles for every candidate deemed above a Good ; and
• if the the voter deems no candidate above a Good, he or she casts circles
for every candidate receiving his or her highest grade.
This behavior implies an average of 2.26 circles per approval ballot in the three
Orsay precincts, an average of 2.09 in the 1st, of 2.27 in the 6th and of 2.43 in
the 12th. This is in substantial agreement with the 2.33 observed in the 2007
approval voting experiment.33
Another observation reinforces the idea that voters express relative opinions
in approval voting. The 2.33 on average approvals of 12 candidates in the 2007
Baujard-Igersheim experiment is an approval rate of 19.4%. The 3.15 on average
approvals of 16 candidates in the 2002 Orsay experiment is an approval rate of
19.7%. This is incredible stability. It cannot be that a fifth of the candidates are
always Good or above independent of who the candidates are (see, e.g., table
29). Behavior that sees voters approving of some 20% of the candidates suggests
33Applying this behavior to the majority judgement ballots of the Orsay experiment to
simulate an approval vote gives the following percentages of ballots with circles: Bayrou
51.1%, Royal 44.8%, Sarkozy 44.1%, Besancenot 16.8%, Voynet 14.5%, Buffet 11.6%, Villiers
9.9%, Bove´ 9.0%, Laguiller 9.0%, Le Pen 8.7%, Nihous 3.2%, Schivardi 2.6%.
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they are making relative evaluations just as they are asked to do, not absolute
evaluations.
We conclude that the approval voting experiments exhibited behavior that
was not purely absolute. There are two implications: first, Arrow’s paradox
cannot be excluded; second, this realization of approval voting is not an instance
of the majority judgement with two grades.
Voting by points and summing
The well nigh universally used mechanism for combining many number grades
into one—in skating, diving, gymnastics, piano, wine and other competitions—
is to add them or to find their average. Recently, bloggers and others in the
U.S.A. and France (and surely other countries) have suggested the same idea for
voting (though the scales have varied). Some have suggested that an “easier”
way to realize the majority judgement would be to assign a 5 to Excellent, a
4 to Very Good, down to a 0 to to Reject, and then simply add the numbers.
Why use the numbers 5 down to 0 instead of (say) 10, 7, 6, 3, 1 and −2 is not
explained. In any case, adding or averaging numbers of some arbitrary scale is
a very misguided idea.
How to construct a scale of measurement is a science in and of itself. “Mea-
surement theory” classifies scales according to their types (see, e.g., [16]). “Nom-
inal measures” use scales that only assign categories (e.g., a postal or telephone
code): the only meaningful comparisons are “equal” or “not equal.” “Ordinal
measures” use scales that only assign an order (e.g., the A, B, C, D, E, F school
grades, the six word language of the Orsay experiment): the only meaningful
comparisons are “equal,” “greater than” and “less than.” “Interval measures”
use number scales that assign an order but where also equal intervals have equal
significance (e.g., Celsius and Fahrenheit temperatures): the meaningful com-
parisons are those of ordinal measurement, but it also makes sense to add, to
subtract, and to find averages. Finally, “ratio mesures” use number scales that
are interval measures but where also zero has an absolute meaning (e.g., length,
price, Kelvin temperatures): the meaningful comparisons are those of interval
measures, but it also makes sense to multiply and divide.
Numerical languages used in practice—for evaluating students, skaters, earth-
quake damages, wines, divers, . . .—define what is meant by the numbers. Den-
mark’s new seven-grade number language adopted for the academic year 2006–
07 (in order to conform with the new European Credit Transfer Accumulation
System’s ECTS grading scale34) is a good example: 12, 10, 7, 4, 2, 0, or −3.
For sums and averages to make any sense at all this scale must be an interval
measure. The language of grades is described as follows:
• 12 (A) – outstanding, no or few unconsiderable flaws, 10% of passing
students,
34The previous Danish number scale had ten integers: 0 through 13 without 1, 2,
4 and 12. The information concerning the Danish grading systems was found in
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPA, Dec. 5, 2007.
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• 10 (B) – excellent, few considerable flaws, 25% of passing students
• 7 (C) – good, numerous flaws, 30% of passing students,
• 4 (D) – fair, numerous considerable flaws, 25% of passing students,
• 2 (E) – adequate, the minimum acceptable, 10% of passing students,
• 0 (Fx) – inadequate,
• −3 (F) – entirely inadequate.
To be an interval measure, the numbers must be related to the percentages of
passing students. Imagine that all the real numbers from 2 (“the minimum
acceptable”) up to 12 are the passing grades (they could be points obtained in
an examination).35 What grade should be assigned to a 5.7? That grade whose
number (2, 4, 7, 10 or 12) is closest to 5.7, namely, good. Any number from the
interval [5.5, 8.5] should be mapped into a good. By the same token any grade
from the interval [2, 3] is mapped into an adequate, from [3, 5.5] into a fair,
from [8.5, 11] into an excellent, and from [11, 12] into an outstanding. The five
numbers (2, 4, 7, 10, 12) were chosen so that the intervals occupy, respectively,
the percentages of the whole equal to the percentages of passing grades specified
in the definition: [2, 3] occupies 10% of the interval from 2 to 12, [3, 5.5] occupies
25%, [5.5, 8.5] occupies 30%, [8.5, 11] occupies 25% and [11, 12] occupies 10%.
But, is it reasonable to use numerical scales in voting? The answer is a
resounding no, for several reasons.
First, the numbers mean nothing unless they are defined: proposals to use
weights give them no definition. Their only real “meaning” is found in their
strategic use. This induces comparisons, which immediately leads to Arrow’s
paradox. In the traditional model Arrow’s paradox arises when a candidate
drops out because that may change the order of finish among the others. Here
it may arise when a candidate drops out because the strategies of voters may
change, provoking a change in the order of finish among the others. Suppose a
0, 1, 2 scale is used, a voter believes several candidates are decent and the rest
bad, gives a 2 to one “preferred” decent candidate, 1’s to the others, 0’s to the
bad candidates. If the candidate with the 2 drops out, the voter may give a
2 to another “decent” candidate. Circumstantial evidence for such behavior is
found in the Baujard-Igersheim 0, 1, 2 experiment [6].
The other ballot of that experiment stated:
Instructions. You give a grade to each of the 12 candidates: either 0,
or 1, or 2 (2 the best grade, 0 the worst). To do so, place a cross in
the corresponding box. . . . The candidate elected with [this] method
is the one who receives the highest number of points.
The instructions are neutral: nothing is said concerning the meaning of 0, 1 or
2. The numbers induce relative, so strategic, behavior. Other numbers could
35This analysis results from a theoretical argument developed in [4].
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have been given. For example, −1, 0, and +1: mathematically there is strictly
no difference, but were these numbers used the behavior of the voters would
almost surely have been different.
On average a ballot contained 1.68 “2’s,” 2.69 “1’s,” and 7.64 “0’s.” Behavior
throughout the six precincts was very similar, so the “0’s,” “1’s,” and “2’s” were
used in the about same way. However, the evidence suggests that voters used
the numbers in a relative sense not an absolute sense. On average the “2’s” were
used 1.68 times per ballot. If voters used the “2’s” as an absolute indication of
merit then its use should correspond to an evaluation of either Excellent, or at
least Very Good, or at least Good,. . . But there are on average 0.69 Excellent ’s,
1.94 at least Very Good ’s, still more at least Good ’s: none agrees with 1.68,
so the behavior seems not to be purely absolute. On the other hand, 1.68 is
in substantial agreement with the average number of highest grades regularly
given in the Orsay experiment, 1.64 (see table 28), suggesting that the “2’s” are
purely relative.
Second, when numbers are used, they may well not be used in the same way
at all: when a 0 to 100 scale is used, some voters may view 80 to be an excellent
grade, others may see it as a merely middling grade.
Third, even if the numbers do provide a common language, they will al-
most certainly not be a proper interval measure, for that depends on who the
candidates are and how the voters give their grades. For example, the 0 to 20
scale used in France is a common language, but an 18, 19 or 20 is unheard of in
philosophy or literature, so the scale is not an interval measure. Once the distri-
bution of the grades is known—after many elections (or many examinations)—it
is possible to determine whether the scale is an interval measure and, if not, to
correct it (as did the Danes). But then it is too late, since the weights must
be announced ahead of time. Candidates and elections are much rarer than
students and examinations, so it is not possible to “learn” and determine norms
as the Danes did.
Excellnt Very Gd Good Acceptbl Poor to Rjct Sum
Avg/ballot all 0.69 1.25 1.50 1.74 2.27 4.55 12
Avg/ballot four 1.57 2.34 1.94 1.49 0.99 3.68 12
Table 29. Average number of grades per majority judgement ballot all
candidates, and four important candidates (Bayrou, Le Pen, Royal and
Sarkozy, normalized to sum to 12).
Fourth, even if it turned out that the scale did approximate an interval mea-
sure, the procedure depends on irrelevant alternatives, it is subject to Arrow’s
paradox: for if one or several candidates drop out, the distribution of the re-
maining grades will almost certainly be different, so the scale is no longer an
interval measure. The weights would then have to be changed to obtain a scale
that makes it an interval measure, which could change the rank-order among
the remaining candidates. When, for example, only the four important candi-
dates are present—Bayrou, Le Pen, Royal and Sarkozy—the distribution of the
grades (normalized to sum to 12) is entirely different (as may be seen in table
34
29). (This change in unimportant to the majority judgement because it is a
purely ordinal method where no adding or averaging is done.)
Finally, there may well be situations where the numbers are at once a com-
mon language and an interval measure: possible examples are those used in
evaluating wines, divers and figure skaters, where the judges are professionals
who have learned the meanings of the numbers and scales. But in this case, as
in all cases when numbers are used, adding (or averaging) is a bad idea because
among all possible mechanisms for amalgamating the numbers it is the most
manipulable, so the most open to exaggeration and outright cheating.
Traditional mechanisms
The traditional mechanisms are Condorcet’s, Borda’s and their derivatives, and
the single-transferable vote. None offers the voters complete freedom of expres-
sion, none yield the electorate’s evaluations of the candidates.
Condorcet’s method has never, it seems, been used in elections. Perhaps
because it is not transitive and, since it ignores evaluations, because it strongly
favors “centrist” candidates (often second in voters’ rank-orders, but not held
in high esteem). It was, for a very short time, used to rank figure skaters,
doubled—in case of an intransitivity—by Borda’s rule (see [4]; in fact, the exact
rule has been proposed and defended [10]).
Borda’s method was adopted in about 1784 to elect members of France’s
Academy of Sciences until a newly elected member, Napole´on Bonaparte, in-
sisted it be discarded in 1800, presumably because it is highly manipulable.
Laplace had argued that this system would determine even the most honest
voters “to rank last the most dangerous opponents to their favorites,” observ-
ing, moreover, that “the institutions which adopted it has led them to abandon
it.” Otherwise, it never seems to have been used in large elctorates. It vio-
lates IIA, it ignores intensities, in Laplace’s words, it gives “a big advantage
to candidates of mediocre merit.” Nevertheless, arguments for it, alone or in
convolutions, continue to be made to the present day [22].
The single transferable vote is, of course, used, notably in Australia and Ire-
land. And yet, it violates IIA, ignores intensities, is not monotone and its rules
for which candidate to drop are completely arbitrary—why drop the candidate
least often first rather than the candidate most often last?—and can lead to dif-
ferent outcomes (in the Faches-Thumesnil experiment [11], respectively, Sarkozy
and Bayrou).
4 Conclusion
Physicists rejected the ptolemaic model that affirmed the moon, planets and
stars revolved about the earth because—in Feynman’s pithy words—“it didn’t
work”: it did not fit the observed facts. The majority judgement experiment
proves that the model on which the theory of social choice and voting is based
is simply not true: voters do not have preference lists of candidates in their
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minds. Moreover, forcing voters to establish preference lists only leads to incon-
sistencies, impossibilities and incompatibilities. The model has led to important
concepts, to criteria for testing the acceptability of voting mechanisms, and to
a beautiful body of mathematical results, but it has failed to establish a science
of social choice that deals with the actual practice of voting as well as the theory
of voting because its premises are false. The time has come for social choice and
voting theorists to turn to a new model.
The experiment shows that the model proposed here—that voters have eval-
uations of candidates in their minds and accept to express them in a common
language—is much closer to the observed facts. Moreover, the model leads to a
coherent theory.
The experiment shows the majority judgement is a practical mechanism.
The theory shows—and the experiment illustrates—that it satisfies almost every
criterion that has been advanced across the years to test whether a method of
voting is acceptable. It is not completely impervious to manipulation. But there
exists no method that is. The majority judgement best resists manipulation by
several criteria, as the experimental evidence has illustrated and mathematical
arguments have proven [4]. It offers voters the greatest freedom of expression
and yields evaluations of all candidates (even when there is only one). Science
is of course not static: more experiments will reveal more about the behavior
of voters and their strategies, so perhaps other means will be found to express
their opinions and to amalgamate them into society’s opinion.
Changes in methods of election inevitably provoke changes in the behavior
of candidates and voters. Today’s voting methods—and in particular, the first-
past-the-post systems—incite candidates to obtain the support of a majority of
the voters and to forget the others. Voters are urged to give their allegiance to
one party and oppose the others. Voters are unable to express their apprecia-
tions of the candidates (even when there are but two candidates, let alone more).
Political strategy focuses on one important point: to gather 51% of the vote.
Minorities may be ignored, even offended. The majority judgement incites can-
didates to seek the highest possible evaluation of every voter. Minorities cannot
be ignored. Voters are confronted with a much more serious question—how do
you evaluate the candidates?—and are given the means to express themselves.
In consequence, instead of focusing on 51% of the electorate up to election day,
then once pronounced the winner claim to represent 100% the next day, a can-
didate is motivated to address his appeal to the entire nation before as well as
after the election. The strategies of the political campaigns with today’s voting
methods cannot be imagined as those with the majority judgement.
Ecclesiastes poses the question:
“Is there any thing whereof it may said, See, this is new?”
Indeed, one century ago, Sir Francis Galton [12] had the germ of the idea of
the majority judgement. He proposed the median as the solution to the budget
problem:
A certain class of problems do not as yet appear to be solved ac-
cording to scientific rules, though they are of much importance and
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of frequent recurrence. Two examples will suffice. (1) A jury has to
assess damages. (2) The council of a society has to fix on a sum of
money, suitable for some purpose. Each voter, whether of the jury
or the council, has equal authority with each of his colleagues. How
can the right conclusion be reached, considering that there may be
as many different estimates as there are members? That conclusion
is clearly not the average of all the estimates, which would give a
voting power to “cranks” in proportion to their crankiness. One
absurdly large or small estimate would leave a greater impress on
the result than one of reasonable amount, and the more an estimate
diverges from the bulk of the rest, the more influence would it exert.
I wish to point out that the estimate to which least objection can
be raised is the middlemost estimate, the number of votes that it is
too high being exactly balanced by the number of votes that it is
too low. Every other estimate is condemned by a majority of voters
as being either too high or too low, the middlemost alone escaping
this condemnation.36
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Appendix
Majority judgement tie-breaking rule
The majority-values of the candidates are used to calculate the majority-
ranking. If the majority-grades37 with mention (the “majority-grades*”) are
different, then they determine the order between two majority-values:
(p, α∗, q)  (s, β∗, t) if α∗  β∗,
where α∗  β∗ if α  β and α+  α0  α−. So suppose the majority-grades
with mention are the same. Then
(p, α+, q)  (s, α+, t) if
{
p > s
p = s and q < t
(recall p > q, s > t),
(p, α0, q)  (s, α0, t) if 100− p− q > 100− s− t (recall p = q, s = t),
37When the number of voters is odd, the majority-grade is the median, or the one middle
grade. In the extremely unlikely case that there is an even number of voters and a candidate’s
two middle grades are different, the general theory shows that the lower of the two middle
grades must be the majority-grade.
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(p, α−, q)  (s, α−, t) if
{
q < t
q = t and p > s
(recall p < q, s < t).
It is highly unlikely that p = s or q = t.
The rule is balanced with regard to higher and lower grades. Call it the
coherent-rule since it is the logical consequence of the general rule (see [2, 4])
that determines an order between any pair of candidates unless both have exactly
the same sets of grades. It is practically certain that it will give an unambiguous
order of finish in any election with many voters.38 The order may be shown to
be monotone and transitive.39
The coherent-rule ranks Royal ahead of Bayrou in Orsay’s 12th precinct (see
table 16) when their majority-values are
Royal (42.4%,Good,40.1%) Bayrou: (40.8%,Good,31.4%),
for both have the majority-grade* Good+, and 42.4% > 40.8%.
It could be argued that Bayrou should rank ahead of Royal because 40.8%−
31.4% = 9.4% is weightier than 42.4%−40.1% = 2.3%. More generally, imagine
the grades of the candidates ordered from best to worst on sea-saws that are
balanced at the median Good : that which weighs more heavily towards the
better-than as versus the worse-than grades should correspond to the candidate
who is ranked higher. This intuitive idea suggests the simple difference-rule:
(p, α, q)  (s, β, t) if
{
α  β or
α = β and p− q > s− t,
(where no mentions ± or 0 are added) that puts Bayrou ahead of Royal.
The difference-rule was suggested by David Gale who at first believed it was
a specialization of the general rule. The coherent-rule, deduced from underlying
principles, is more subtle: if the weight of one candidate leans toward the better-
than side, the weight of the the other leans toward the worse-than side then the
better-than side is of course ahead. If both candidates lean toward the better-
than side, then the one whose better-than side is the weightier is ahead of the
other—so Royal with 42.4% is ahead of Bayrou with 40.8%—because there are
more voters who really care about Royal than there are who really care about
Bayrou. Symmetrically, if both candidates lean toward the worse-than side,
then the one whose worse-than side is the weightier is behind the other.
The difference-rule favors centrist candidates in comparison with the coherent-
rule because it only contrasts better-than with worse-than, ignoring the absolute
weight of better-than or the absolute weight of worse-than.
The difference-rule is also less resistant to manipulation than the coherent-
rule. It may be shown that if a group of voters is able to change the order
38If not, the general rule may be used.
39To show that it is transitive, consider any majority-value (p, α, q) and associate with
it the vector (α, σ, β, γ) where: σ = sign(p − q), (p = q means σ = 0 and + > 0 > −);
β = p(if σ = +)− q(if σ = −) and γ = −q(if σ = +) + p(if σ = −) + (100%− p− q)(if σ = 0).
The given rule defines a lexicographic order on (α, σ, β, γ).
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between two candidates with the coherent-rule then necessarily that group can
also change the order with the difference-rule [4]. On the other hand, there are
instances when a group of voters can change the outcome with the difference-rule
but not with the coherent-rule.
To better see what is going on, imagine two candidates R and B with
majority-values
R: (40%,Good,20%) B: (30%,Good,20%),
R ranks ahead of B by both rules. But if 5 + % (where  > 0) of the voters
who gave B grades worse than Good increase them to better than Good they
can change the order with the difference-rule but not with the coherent-rule,
since that would give the majority-values
R: (40%,Good,20%) B: (35 + %,Good,15− %).
To change the order with the coherent-rule would require (10 + %) to increase
the grades they give B from worse to better than Good—twice as many voters—
for that yields the majority-values
R: (40%,Good,20%) B: (40 + %,Good,10− %).
Now consider the real problem of table 23. The majority-values were
Bayrou: (44.3%,Good,30.6%) Royal: (39.4%,Good,41.5%).
so Bayrou ranked well ahead of Royal by both rules. Now suppose the voters
made the strategic changes indicated in table 23 except that all of the type
D voters changed as indicated (not just 1/3 of them). This means 42.6% of
the voters able to have a strategic impact try to do so. Then their respective
majority-values become
Bayrou: (42.2%,Good,41.2%) Royal: (42.0%,Good,40.8%).
With the coherent-rule Bayrou remains ahead, with the difference-rule Royal
takes the lead. Thus the coherent-rule better resists manipulation.
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